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In light of recent political events Nietzsche was (again) charged as proponent of
unscrupulous power-politics and as predecessor of “post-truth.” A passage from
his late notes is notoriously quoted to denounce him as gurehead of relativism,
truth-denial and post-factual attitudes: “facts are precisely what there is not, only
interpretations.” By means of an analysis of this passage and its 19th century con-
texts, the paper reconstructs Nietzsche’s criticism of absolute truth. He problema-
tizes notions of truth on the basis of epistemological, physiological, historical, and
sociological considerations, arguing in favour of self-reexive, pluralistic, andmod-
est epistemic attitudes, which are occasionally associated with relativism. Unlike
certain cliché-versions of relativism Nietzsche denies that every “perspective” is
equally valid, and develops and employs a variety of interpretational and argu-
mentative standards. ese standards are not absolute, but allow human evalu-
ations of knowledge-claims. e proposed alternative between “truth” or “post-
truth” construes a false opposition and underestimates the need for informed value-
judgments in politics and culture. In conclusion it is argued that prosecutors and
defendants of “post-truth” are similarly vulnerable for resentful dogmatic ideolo-
gies, because of unwillingness or inability to accept and employ a post-absolutist
loss of certainty.
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Signal of an unscienticman: he takes an opinion for true, if it atters
him and makes him look good. (Nietzsche 1988, 498f)
1. Post-Truth Nietzsche?
When the editors of the OxfordDictionaries decided to declare “Post-Truth”
the word of the year 2016 they drew international attention to recent trends
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in political discourse in Western democracies. e neologism was mainly
coined to describe certain features of processes of public decision-making
such as the presidential election in the United States or the British referen-
dum about membership in the European Union. According to some ob-
servers, public statements of inuential politicians, viral tweets in the new
media, the strategies of political campaigns and parts of the media-coverage
were oblivious or ignorant of plain facts and truths to a yet unprecedented
degree. e dictionary denes “post-truth” as “relating to or denoting cir-
cumstances in which objective facts are less inuential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief ” and provides two ex-
emplary statements: “in this era of post-truth politics, it’s easy to cherry-pick
data and come to whatever conclusion you desire” or “some commentators
have observed that we are living in a post-truth age.”1 Unlike other com-
posites with “post-“ such as “post-modern” or “post-colonial,” post-truth is
obviously meant in an unmasking and compromising way.e term itself is
inevitably embedded in political discourse, incriminating others for their in-
creasing disrespect for facts and truth. Particularly in light of Trump’s or the
Brexiteer’s campaigns this impression seems well justied, and its diagnos-
tic validity is taken for granted for the sake of argument in this paper. One
should, however, keep in mind that talk about “post-truth politics” implies
the contrast to an earlier and dierent, by now elapsed state of aairs. Were
we once living in a political truth-age? When was it? Even the critical label
predates Trump (Keyes 2004). e question whether esteem for facts and
truth in politics decreased in a way justifying this new label is an empirical
and historical problem, which could not be addressed in this paper. I rather
turn to the philosophical problem of “post-truth” and the related issue of
philosopher’s responsibility for the current political and cultural situation.
Some commentators, in search for an explanation of the “post-truth” cli-
mate, pointed to a supposed tradition of philosophers decrying truth. Par-
ticularly FriedrichNietzsche is oennamed in contexts of truth-denial (Hig-
gins 2016). On July 5th 2016, a New York Times article stated that “Trump
embodies a Nietzschean morality rather than a Christian one. It is char-
acterized by indierence to objective truth (there are no facts, only inter-
pretations).”2 I leave it to others to contemplate the traditional connection
betweenChristianity and objective truth. Nietzsche, however, serves as god-
father and outspoken representative of indierence to facts and objectivity.
1 OxfordDictionaries, “Word of the year 2016 is . . .post-truth”, https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016.
2 Peter Wehner “e eology of Donald Trump” in e New York Times
July 5, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/opinion/campaign-stops/
the-theology-of-donald-trump.html.
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Because of his critical remarks about traditional concepts of truth, Simon
Blackburn, employing the very same quote, calls him “the Arch-Debunker”
(Blackburn 2005, 73) and Maria Baghramian notes that Nietzsche is “pos-
sibly the most inuential single philosopher of relativism in recent history”
(Baghramian 2010, 45). e—wrong cited—notorious quote is taken from
Nietzsche’s late notes written down in spring 1887. It is a private jotting, a
memo not meant for publication and reads as follows:
Against positivism which halts at the phenomenon “ere are only
facts” Iwould say: no, precisely facts donot exist, only interpretations.
We cannot determine any fact “in itself ”: perhaps it is a nonsense to
want such a thing. “Everything is subjective,” you say: but that itself is
an interpretation, the “subject” is not a given, but an added-on-ction,
tucked-behind.—Is it at last necessary to posit the interpreter behind
the interpretation? Even that is poetry, hypothesis. Inasmuch as the
word “knowledge” [“Erkenntnis”] has anymeaning at all, the world is
knowable: but it is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind
it, but countless meanings. “Perspectivism.” [. . . ] (Nietzsche 2003,
139)
Despite its provisional character, the text is clear enough. e apparent de-
nial of facts is not simply stated as a doctrine but introduced as an anti-thesis
and anti-dote to a positivist assumption, that there are clear, plain, and ob-
vious facts alone. Moreover, the text actually admits the phenomenon of
“facts,” but requires and invites further critical examination. In opposition
to positivism Nietzsche states that there are no facts without interpretation,
i.e. without selection, valuation, adoption, contextualization, simplication,
reduction of complexity, etc.. e note continues with a warning that the
signicance of interpretation should not be confused with subjectivism.e
world is knowable to us, in away according to us, to our capacities andneeds.
e alternative to objectivism is not subjectivism, but a certain kind of an-
thropocentrism. Human beings form interpretations of the world we live
in, which must—for the sake of survival—be somewhat successful. We shall
see that Nietzsche argues that interpretations could be good or bad, despite
their inevitable under-determination by data or text.ey are ordering sim-
plications and therefore, strictly speaking, falsications of empirical abun-
dance according to specic human standards.ese standards accord to the
needs and values of living human beings and dierent standards and dif-
ferent successful interpretations are possible, they were and still are actually
real.
Nietzsche’s philosophical project in this regard is notmainly destructive.
He points to the limits of simple trust in “the given” and eectively tries to
counterbalance one-sided objectivist views. As he notes a few years earlier:
“To mock the school of “objectivists” and “positivists.” ey wish to avoid
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the value-judgements and discover and present the facta alone” (Nietzsche
1988, 241). In his denial of facts as such, Nietzsche also emphasizes the ne-
cessity and inevitability of values. He demands an increased awareness of the
active role we are playing in our world of experience. Claims on factual truth
are always charged with value-judgements; they reveal an order of rank of
preferences regarding our physiological faculties and needs, our epistemic
interests and values, and our cultural tasks and goals. Which piece of per-
ceived data is signicant in what a way, what context, for what purpose, and
what does it mean? Knowledge implies and requires evaluation. While this
observation also applies to scientic theories, it is more obviously the case
in domains of political discourse. From a “Nietzschean” perspective, con-
temporary debates about post-truth and fake-news reveals the intellectual
limits and moral prejudices of bounded and un-free spirits on both sides of
the political spectrum.
In order to explicate this view I shall proceed in two steps. In a rst step
I will reconstruct Nietzsche’s views on truth within the contexts of his late
19th century readings of Schopenhauer, Lange, Comte and others. ese
contexts indicate that Nietzsche was well justied to perceive a certain ver-
sion of epistemic relativism or contextualism as the most advanced and en-
lightened philosophical view. His denial of mere facts in favour of human
interpretations allows to evaluate the quality of human knowledge-claims
nonetheless. Far from assuming equal validity for any powerful proposition,
I argue in a second step that Nietzsche applies and employs criteria to qual-
ify interpretations.ese criteria, however, are in themselves (only) human
standards. e paper concludes with theses on post-truth politics, suggest-
ing that the debate itself indicates that the conscious, self-condent, enlight-
ened and sovereign state of aairs Nietzsche envisions is not yet reached.
2. Nietzsche in Context—Overcoming the Quest for Certainty
Nietzsche reservations against dogmatic trust in facts are not limited to his
late unpublished notes. In the preface of Beyond Good and Evil he observes
that “dogmatism of all types standing sad and discouraged,” and he further
writes that some critics of traditional philosophy even assume “that dog-
matism is in its last gasps” and basically failed to conquer truth (Nietzsche
2001, 3). Nietzsche does notmean to be original here.e negative diagnosis
regarding dogmatism is presented as the widely accepted view he basically
takes for granted. Nietzsche was an intent and thoughtful observer of the
discussions about human knowledge, its limits and prospectives in the later
19th century. During his readings he encountered reservations against the
ideal of merely given facts and truths at various occasions. A broad vari-
ety of philosophers, historians, and scientists opposed absolutist aspirations
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and insisted on the conditional character of human knowledge. It becomes
particularly obvious in the light of his readings that Nietzsche took the col-
lapse of absolutist claims on truth to be the most advanced epistemological
view of his time. Accordingly, the defeat of dogmatism is not Nietzsche’s
main task, he is more interested in the causes and again even more in the
consequences of its downfall.
e failure of dogmatism, Nietzsche assumes in a moderate claim on
originality, results from its overly solemn approach, from prejudices, false
assumptions, and over-ambitious expectations. Traditional philosophers
tried to erect eternal systems, but the allegedly “sublime and unconditional
philosophical edices that the dogmatists used to build” actually rested on
“folk superstition,” on a “seduction of grammar, or an over-eager general-
ization from facts that are really very local, very personal, very human-all-
too-human” (Nietzsche 2001, 3). Far from being unconditioned or absolute,
these philosophical systems were relative to their culture, their common-
sense, their language, and their perspectives. According to Nietzsche, ideas
such as “pure spirit” or “the Good in itself ” are “the worst, most prolonged,
and most dangerous of all errors to this day,” they meant “standing truth
on its head and disowning even the perspectival, which is the fundamental
condition of all life” (Nietzsche 2001, 4).
Recognizing the perspectival condition of life is the outcome of the er-
roneous dogmatist ambition. e institutionalized quest for objective and
unconditioned truth itself lead to the self-undermining insight that human
beings might be peculiar animals, who are able to comprehend the perspec-
tival condition of life, but who do not escape it. While the failing dogmatists
are subject of ironic mockery, Nietzsche rather seriously sees “good reasons
for hoping that all dogmatizing in philosophy was just noble (though child-
ish) ambling and preambling” (Nietzsche 2001, 3). He calls for “hope that the
dogmatists” philosophy was only a promise over the millennia” and invites
not to be “ungrateful towards dogmatism.”is is the leitmotif of the preface
and to a certain degree of Nietzsche’s Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
in general: e hope that the dogmatist quest for absolute truth and some
“in itself,” however based on false assumptions and including its inevitable
shipwreck, might serve a productive and promising cultural role and en-
ables new cultural opportunities: “But now that it has been overcome, and
Europe breathes a sigh of relief aer this nightmare, and at least can enjoy a
healthier—well—sleep, we,whose task is wakefulness itself, are the heirs to all
the force cultivated through the struggle against this error” (Nietzsche 2001,
4). Complete wakefulness might inevitably remain to be a task for some
rather than a reality for all, but the sleep could be more or less healthy. It
is important to note that Nietzsche denes his role as a heir of this struggle
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and its achievements, in particular the value of intellectual honesty. ese
considerations place Nietzsche in contexts of radicalized enlightenment. He
assumes a widely acknowledged collapse of claims on absolutely uncondi-
tioned knowledge, and tries to draw new conclusions from this situation.
Looking into Nietzsche’s contexts helps to better understand and appre-
ciate his particular reservations against the objectivist and positivist trust in
facts and truth. I shall therefore discuss three authors with signicant im-
pact on his philosophy in general, and on his understanding of the limits
of truth in particular: Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Albert Lange and
Auguste Comte. Nietzsche encountered Schopenhauer’sWorld as Will and
Representation in a bookstore in Leipzig in October or November 1865 and
read it with enthusiasm shortly thereaer. Schopenhauer initially triggered
Nietzsche’s philosophical ambition; namely his discussion of Kant and of
contemporary academic philosophy contains two aspects essential to un-
derstand the younger’s stance towards truth: Schopenhauer observes, rst,
the collapse of dogmatism and, second, has a sense for the far-reaching cul-
tural implications of this downfall. In his rebuttal of Professorenphilosophie
Schopenhauer notes that he no longer employs the “fable” cleverly devised
by “well-paid lectern-philosophers” of an “immediately and absolutely cog-
nizing, intuiting or apprehending reason” (Schopenhauer 1873, xxvii).3 In
direct opposition to such prejudices, Schopenhauer denies “the dogmatist’s
declaration that the external world is real apart from the subject” and de-
clares that without our understanding the world is nothing: “e entire
world of objects is, and remains, representation; and precisely because of
this, it is and will always be thoroughly conditioned by the subject, that is:
the world has transcendental ideality” (Schopenhauer 1873, 17).e way we
perceive and know theworld is neither absolute nor unconditioned, but rela-
tive to the reasoning subject and its necessary conditions of thought and rep-
resentation. Schopenhauer is an anti-absolutist who renders claims about
“the” nature of “the” reality dogmatic and empty. His “relativism,” however,
is constrained by the categorically necessary conditions of thought and rep-
resentation. Schopenhauer therefore neither allows arbitrary subjectivism,
nor does he admit a plurality of equally valid phenomenal worlds.e tran-
scendental ideality of the world must be the same for every rational subject.
e early Nietzsche adopted the specic version of Kantianism he found
in Schopenhauer and continuously employed and radicalized it. His rst
philosophical book, e Birth of Tragedy already attributes the “hardest
fought victory” to the “wisdom and courage of Kant and Schopenhauer”
3 I refer to Nietzsche’s copy of Schopenhauer’s works, which is kept at the Herzogin Anna
Amalia Bibliothek in Weimar with the reference number C 321-b. e edition Nietzsche
read in 1865 is lost. Translations into English are my own.
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(Nietzsche 1999, 87). eir sober and considerate application “of the tools
of science itself ” revealed the “constrains and conditionality of insight” and
decisively rejected the optimistic “claim of science to universal validity and
universal goals” (Nietzsche 1999, 87). While this overcoming of epistemic
optimism is a joint achievement of Kant and Schopenhauer, only Schopen-
hauer, soNietzsche assumes, realized its tremendous and dangerous cultural
implications. In contrast to the common saying that “Kant has had a living
and life-transforming inuence” Nietzsche notes that this is the case appar-
ently for “only a very few men” (Nietzsche 1997, 140) such as Schopenhauer.
Despite the intellectual revolution Kant initiated he did not reach the minds
andhearts of amajority of people.e rst impact ofKant on thosewho fully
apprehend the implications and consequences of his philosophy should be
a complete undermining of the most fundamental certainties we relied on
so far: “If Kant ever should begin to exercise any wide inuence we shall be
aware of it in the form of a gnawing and disintegrating scepticism and rel-
ativism” (Nietzsche 1997, 140). Nietzsche saw Kant as the most signicant
representative and begetter of relativism; a philosophy which renders our
traditional quest for truth impossible.
e case of Heinrich von Kleist illustrates that a proper understanding
of Kant naturally leads to relativism in a rst step. While the immediate
consequence of Kant’s insight must be destructive, in the long run it might
open new prospects and emancipatory options. If taken seriously, this in-
sight into our lack of truth, i.e. of any absolute measure of orientation and
certainty should lead to a fundamental crisis, which is only postponed, sup-
pressed or ignored. Nietzsche asks with concern: “When, indeed, will men
again feel in this natural Kleistian fashion, when will they again learn to as-
sess the meaning of a philosophy in the “most sacred part” of their being?”
(Nietzsche 1997, 141). A fundamental crisis of cultural and intellectual ori-
entation is not only natural, it is also needed, because it serves a cultural role
and calls for a solution. Only if we really understand the implications of the
collapse of dogmatism could we accept its inheritance. e implications of
our erroneous trust in a human organ for truth must be taken serious:
[I]f we are to understand what, aer Kant, Schopenhauer can be to
us—namely the leaderwho leads us from the depths of sceptical gloom
or criticizing renunciation up to the heights of tragic contemplation,
to the nocturnal sky and its stars extended endlessly above us, and
who was himself the rst to take his path. (Nietzsche 1997, 141)
Nietzsche later ceased to believe, that Schopenhauer, his “tragic contempla-
tion” and his whole “artiste’s metaphysics” (Nietzsche 1999, 5) could be the
guide out of despair. But his engagement with Schopenhauer shows two
essential features of Nietzsche’s philosophy in the context of contemporary
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debates about post-truth: Nietzsche understood the failure of traditional
concepts of truth as the an clearly stated result of the most advanced con-
temporary philosophy. And this failure begets a crisis, indeed, but a crisis
necessary for cultural transformation. ese Nietzschean conclusions are
reinforced by further readings.
e second important context of Nietzsche necessary to mention is
Friedrich Albert Lange’s History of Materialism, rst published in 1866. In
addition to Schopenhauer’s mainly philosophical and epistemological argu-
ments, Lange points to the history of science, too. He draws a line of counter-
arguments against the absolutist aspirations from the ancient Greek mate-
rialists and sophists via omas Hobbes and Baron d’Holbach to contem-
porary philosophy and science. Like Schopenhauer, he mainly grants it to
the philosophical rigour or Kant, but also to the historical consciousness of
scientists and to the intellectual talent of French mathematicians “that to-
day the exact science in all domains of experience no longer set up absolute
truths, but only relative ones; that the conditions of the acquired knowledge
are always recalled, and that the accuracy of all doctrine is justied on the
reservation of the progress of knowledge” (Lange 1866, 244).e combination
of empiricism and fallibilism with a hypothetico-deductive understanding
of scientic progress leads Lange to a certain concept of relativism. is
concept not only means to provide an appropriate understanding of human
knowledge and science; it is also taken as a better, more promising, and self-
conscious epistemic attitude. Admitting the lack of certainty is the only at-
titude in accordance with science, and which enables further scientic and
cultural progress:
Lange is quick to point out that Kant’s theory of knowledge is one that
is compatible with the views of “men of science.” He relates Kant’s ac-
count of the constitutive function of Sinnlichkeit to the studies in the
physiology of the senses and to Protagoras’ principle that “man is the
measure of all things’. Probing behind Kant’s notion that our senses
apprehend appearances, our organs. If we add to this the idea that our
experience is conditioned by our “intellectual organization’, then we
see that the phenomenal appearances we apprehend are specically
relative to our sensory-cognitive organization and that beings with
another organisation would experience dierent phenomena. (Stack
1983, 196f)
Reference to physiology adds the materialistic or naturalistic twist typical
for Lange’s (and Nietzsche’s) Kantianism. e cautious reserve, however,
also applies to materialism, too. While it is generally rational to prefer natu-
ralistic explications over super-naturalistic ones, unconditioned faith in a
universal naturalistic ontology is not. Lange quotes Justus von Liebig to
argue that materialism (as much as any other dogmatic ontological doc-
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trine) reveals ignorance of the history of science as well as lack of philo-
sophical and mathematical education. Materialism and the application of
complex mathematics formed the core of scientic success only aer their
functional nature was acknowledged. Namely the mathematical conven-
tionalists in France “breathed life into the mathematical formulas, and from
the essence of denition and conclusion produced that consistent relativism,
which alone forms the basis of all exactness” (Lange 1866, 323). Conscious
awareness of the hypothetical and functional character of the premises not
only “protects from enthusiasm” (Lange 1866, 323), it also allows science to
grow, to reorganize, and to adjust to changing epistemic and cultural needs
and interests.
Lange’s prime example is Newton’s introduction of the law of gravita-
tion into cosmology, which helped to unify planetary and molecular theory
and to precisely calculate the respectivemovements. Notwithstanding New-
ton’s reluctance to admit, Lange is convinced that the very idea of gravitation
implies some actio in distans, which fundamentally opposes the basic under-
standing of traditional mechanism:
e absurdity of the eect in the distance, however, was made harm-
less for the exact sciences, by pushing it back into the metaphysical
beginnings of natural science and leaving it as unaected as possible.
e increasing relativism soon brought with it that it was no longer
necessary for the progress of the sciences to have a completely satis-
factory starting point. If only one had a xed point at all, from which
one could advance. e absolute foundation was le for the meta-
physician; the natural scientist kept to the relative. (Lange 1866, 359f)
According to Lange, modern science succeeds without a clear and accessi-
ble absolute foundation, In his image, science is an economic and functional
organisation of practical and mathematical knowledge, which successfully
allows us to explicate, calculate, and control natural events. Modern science
usesmathematical construction and empirical tests to set aside foundational
metaphysical questions about the nature of reality. We do not exactly know
how a body makes another very distant body move, but we can predict, cal-
culate, and thereby control it up to an incredible precision. Whether our sci-
entic theories are “true” beyond their practical success, in the sense of cor-
responding to some absolute and purely objective order of the world, is not
(anymore) a scientic question and should therefore be insignicant to sci-
entists. In light of the authors discussed above there seems to be a broad and
inuential movement, if not consensus, that human beings possess no ab-
solute knowledge. According to this image, modern science works with rel-
atively valid, hypothetical theories, with models, useful ctions, functional
simplications and generalisations.
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In 1884, when Nietzsche re-read Lange’sHistory of Materialism in its re-
vised and extended edition, he made a note which is very illuminating in
regard of his perspective on the active role the subject plays in epistemic
contexts—and regarding his broader philosophical project. Nietzsche copies
a passage from Lange which says that “a reality as man imagines it” in the
sense of “an absolutely rm existence independent of us and yet recognized
by us—such a reality does not exist” (Nietzsche 1988, 94).4 Nietzsche sum-
marizes the relativist conclusion “We are active in it,” but goes on to give
his explication of Lange a peculiar twist: “but that gives no pride to Lange!”
(Nietzsche 1988, 94). While emphasizing the enlightening and liberating as-
pect of the collapse of absolutism, he reproaches Lange for “he desires noth-
ing deceptive, changing, dependent, unrecognizable—these are instincts of
frightened beings and those who are still morally dominated: they desire an
absolute lord, something loving truth-talking—in short, this longing of the
idealist is morally-religious from the slave’s point of view out” (Nietzsche
1988, 94). e alternative Nietzsche has in mind takes the collapse of abso-
lutism not as a sad though appropriate insight into the condition of human
knowledge, but as an encouraging invitation to accept and employ our ac-
tive role with consciousness and condence: “Just the opposite, our artist-
sovereign right could revel in having created this world. “subjectively only,”
but I feel the opposite: we have created it!” (Nietzsche 1988, 94). is spirit
reveals the same transformatory ambition of the preface toBeyondGood and
Evil. Nietzsche combines insight in the limited validity of our knowledge-
claims and the active role we play in constructing our phenomenal world
with an emancipatory and creative goal of conscious armation.
A third set of readings I wish to address leads closer to Nietzsche par-
ticular understanding of positivism and indicates that he adopted as well as
rejected some of its views. Nietzsche owned a German translation of intro-
ductory parts of the Cours de philosophie positive in which Auguste Comte
associates the false assumption of “unconditioned knowledge” with the the-
ological and metaphysical age of humankind, while the mind of the con-
temporary scientic stadium renounces from such ambitions and “realizes
the impossibility to achieve absolute knowledge” (Comte 1880, 3).5 Mod-
ern man renounces universal truth and accepts the limited validity of the
little facts we know. Comte’s positivism not only denies absolutism, it even
explicitly adopts its alternative, relativism. His understanding of relativism,
4 e quotation stems from Lange (1882, 822); the emphases are Nietzsche’s.
5 I refer to Nietzsche’s copy Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive, an abbreviated German
translation kept in Weimar with the reference number C 246. Translations into English
are my own.ere is good evidence that Nietzsche read other works of and about Comte;
see (Piazzesi 2016, 341–361).
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however, diers signicantly frommost of themore recent discussions about
that term. In another text probably unknown to Nietzsche, Comte explicitly
points to the advantages of “relativism” contained in positivism in his at-
tempt to convince the “true conservatives” to adopt the positivist “synthese
nale” as constitutional philosophy. According to Comte, the benecial va-
lidity of “relativisme” not only applies “to the entire intellectual domain,
where its universality is no longer disputed, except by backward thinkers”
but also to the practical and moral order (Comte 1855, 23).6 To Comte, rel-
ativism is the informed, reexive, and modest mind-set of modern science,
it is also the only intellectual attitude that ensure human sympathy and cul-
tural progress:
Regarding sentiment, this extension becomes irrefutable if one con-
siders [. . . ] the anity between relative character and a sympathetic
disposition, in contrast with the spontaneous connection between
egoism and the absolute. As for activity, relativismmust always dom-
inate our projects and our hopes, since continuous improvement sup-
poses constant imperfection. Instead of representing the best as the
enemy of good, positivism proclaims that happiness, and even duty,
is incompatible with any absolute aspiration, under any of the aspects
peculiar to human existence. (Comte 1855, 23)
According to John Stuart Mill’s sympathetic explication of Comte’s philoso-
phy, this is the core doctrine of positivism: “We have no knowledge of any-
thing other than phenomena, and our knowledge of phenomena is relative,
not absolute” (Mill 1874, 4).7 We only know the relation between facts, their
succession and similarity, the essence of things is unknown and unknowable
to us. In sharp contrast to the mainly derogatory usage of the word in the
20th century, Comte understands relativism as the epistemologically valid
position of non-retarded thinkers. And since a relativistic mind is better
prepared to acknowledge alternatives and to admit imperfection, it is natu-
rally better prepared for open-mindedness and progress. In his rejection of
positivism, however, Nietzsche moves a step further and denies that signi-
cant and informative facts are merely given, because “facts” must always be
recognized, selected, pondered, evaluated, in short: interpreted. Ignoring
6 In her history of relativism, Maria Baghramian fails to note the positive use of relativism
in Comte. Referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, she writes that John Grote was the
rst to introduce “relativism” as a technical term in 1865 (Baghramian 2004, 11). Grote
indeed claims that the “notion of the mask over the face of nature is [. . . ] what I have
called “relativism”” (Grote 1865, 229). Comte, however, spoke of “relativisme” ten years
earlier.
7 I refer to Nietzsche’s highly annotated copy of Comte’s Appel aux conservateurs.e refer-
ence number in the Weimar library is C 713-b. Translations into English are my own.
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this need for interpretation exposes intellectual insuciency, which in turn
points to underlying weakness.
is is exactly the view of another French authorNietzsche read between
1885 and 1887 with some enthusiasm in contexts of his criticism of religion
and traditionalmorality: JeanMarie Guyau explicitly acknowledges the “rel-
ativity of human knowledge” and highlights the cultural and epistemic ad-
vantages of the self-reexivemodesty involved (Guyau 1887, 116).8 e quest
for absolute certainty and the dogmatic insistence on unconditioned truth
reveals the weakness of a barbaric and uncivilized state of mind, driven by
emotions rather than reason (Guyau 1887, 109f). Guyau therefore states that
tolerance is not only founded in respect for others but based on intelligence.
Realizing the innite variety of theworld and the impossibility of any one so-
lution supports informed distrust in human knowledge and conscience as an
essential source of tolerance, while “intolerance is only the outside extension
of the exclusive domination of dogmatic faith exercised within us” (Guyau
1887, 111). Relativism therefore, is not only supported by objective reasons,
but it is the view of a sovereign and self-reexive culture which could bear
to note, tolerate, and endorse alterity. Like Schopenhauer, Lange, Mill, and
Comte, Guyau basically takes the relative validity and context-dependency
of human knowledge for granted and highlights the emancipatory prospects
of a culture, strong enough to admit this condition. Nietzsche’s reservations
against absolutism strongly resembles this perspective.
3. On the Virtue of Cautious Reserve
If we, by way of conclusion, approach the issue of “post-truth” in Nietzsche
from a broader, less methodological stance, we can distinguish four kinds
of arguments he proposes in favour of it at various occasions and in various
contexts. First there are the philosophical-epistemic considerations. Em-
inent philosophers such as Kant, Schopenhauer, Mill, Comte, and others
came to the conclusion that the human mind is active. ey agreed that we
have no immediate and unconditioned access to the empirical world as such,
not tomention something absolute.ese consideration require intellectual
modesty and an experimental attitude, but they do not render rational dis-
course impossible. Unlike the cliché of a blatant relativist, who takes what-
ever pleases him for a sacred and unquestionable truth, Nietzsche’s critique
of absolutism requires cautious reserve.
Nietzsche’s philosophical anti-absolutist arguments are bolstered by
physiological and biological insights Nietzsche derived from his readings
8 Nietzsche owned a copy of this book. Reference number in Nietzsche’s late library is C 268.
Again, translations into English are my own.
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of Lange and of scientists such as Helmholtz, Du Bois-Reymond or Zöll-
ner. Not only our conceptual interpretation, but already sensual perception
is an active process, produced by our contingent human nature. Sensory
organs simplify and interpret the world, but they respond to the same un-
qualied world of becoming and they express similar human needs. Our
intellect is an instrument of survival, not of truth-acquisition. Regarding
observation, however, all members of the human species are basically cap-
tured within the same perspective and could therefore agree on their world-
view. Within the limited domain of science, human research produces useful
and reliable knowledge. Scientic ndings are relative to our mathematics
and our axioms, relative to our sensory organization and our experimental
settings, and they are relative to our epistemic and practical interests, val-
ues and needs. Neo-Kantians, positivists, and evolutionary materialists not
only agreed on the collapse of absolutism, they also saw their specic under-
standing of relativism as in accordance with science. Truth became a regu-
lative idea. e assumption of simultaneously absolute and demonstrable
starting-points was abandoned and replaced by functional and hypotheti-
cal considerations. Nietzsche observes this “loss of certainty” (Schiemann
2008; Schiemann 2016), which separates modern science from classical me-
chanics, and he was well justied to take it as the advanced and informed
understanding of science at his time.
But absolutism was not only undermined by philosophy and by science
itself. A rened understanding for language lead to the same result. Ni-
etzsche learned from Herder, Gerber, and others that language is no rep-
resentation of plain facts, but a translation into human metaphors, which
serves a social function embedded in evolutionary needs. Every proposi-
tional worldview is a translation into constructed signs and human gram-
mar, by which alone we can speak and think. e social character of lan-
guage and grammar, however, requires us to use the established metaphors,
we cannot do without.is explains why the philological art of careful read-
ing remains important to Nietzsche. He allows a hierarchy of interpretations
by means of non-absolute standards of evaluation.
Aer the decline of Hegel, historical consciousness provides a fourth set
of arguments in favour of relativism (Burckhardt, Taine, Mach et al.). Not
only our cultural certainties and idiosyncrasies, even epistemic categories
are subject to change and the development of knowledge is not only progress
but change of (epistemic) interests, values, orientation.e collapse of truth
results from a self-reection and self-overcoming of ourwill to truth; it is not
meant to be an objectively true doctrine, but denotes a reasonable epistemic
attitude. Nietzsche’s saying that there are no facts but only interpretations,
should not be confused with sceptic epoché or with arbitrary indierence.
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Living creatures must interact with their world, they cannot suspend judg-
ment and completely stay aside, but they must form beliefs about dangerous
and friendly, eatable and poisonous, good and bad by interpreting informa-
tion. Whatever lives, interprets (Simon 1986). As such, interpretations can
never be true as such, but they could be more or less successful.
It seems that these philosophical, scientic, linguistic and historical con-
sideration placeNietzsche in close connection to epistemic relativism, a view
oen dened as a composition of two theses: First, a relativity- or depen-
dency-thesis and second, a plurality- or symmetry-thesis.9 While Nietzsche
clearly subscribes to the rst, he signicantly less so does to the second. Ex-
periencing and cognizing are active processes, the characteristics of the bi-
ological, social, cultural and individual subject contribute to its emergence,
its content, and to its justication. However, if one assumes that an epistemic
relativist must entertain the view, that any statement is equally valid or ap-
propriate in any given context or situation, Nietzsche is none. He expresses
respect for the ontological assumptions, methods, practices, and results of
the sciences.ere is broad evidence that he approved of scientic ndings,
read scientic literature, even intended to study chemistry and physics. Ni-
etzsche accepts the assumption that God is dead, or Copernicus” claim that
the earth is moving. He was strongly inuenced by his anti-religious and
anti-metaphysical contemporary “Age of Science.”10 But far from assuming
an unconstrained authority of “the sciences” he rather observes a process of
“self-sublimation” (Nietzsche 2006, 119), by which the institutionalized will
to truth undermines its own foundations and proves its limited validity (Heit
2016). Science reveals itself to Nietzsche as a subtle and sublime work of art,
but this does not render it worthless. He therefore saw relativism as the natu-
ral and appropriate epistemic attitude of a condent and conscious scientic
time, whereas dogmatist philosophy and absolutist speculations only lead to
superstition and failure.
ese considerations shed light on a passage in Nietzsche’s writings,
which is particularly illuminating to estimate his contribution to our con-
temporary concern with post-truth. Section 631 of Human All Too Human
including the neighbouring aphorisms, deepens and species the educa-
tional and transformatory dimension ofNietzsche’s views on truth in amod-
ern and free culture. In section 630, he denes: “Conviction is the belief
that on some particular point of knowledge one is in possession of the un-
conditioned truth” (Nietzsche 1996, 199). is belief presupposes that un-
conditioned truth exists, that we possess perfect methods to acquire it, and
that these methods were perfectly employed by the holder of the convic-
9 See, for example, (Baghramian 2004, 138); (Boghossian 2006, 73).
10 See (Moore and Brobjer 2004) or (Heit et al. 2014).
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tion. It seems unlikely that all these requirements are met in regard of com-
plex political issues. Notwithstanding their questionable principal tenabil-
ity, their character alone indicates ignorance, for it denies the hypothetical
self-understanding of modern science. Nietzsche therefore concludes that
“that the man of convictions is not the man of scientic thought” (Nietzsche
1996, 199). Holding convictions reveals an un-scientic state of mind, but
moreover, holding a conviction is not only an epistemic, but also and more
importantly a certain psychological state.
Very much like Comte or Guyau, Nietzsche associates the capacity to
cope with a post-truth condition with individual and cultural strength.
“From the ages in which men were accustomed to believe in possession of
unqualied truth there has come a profound displeasure with all sceptical
and relativistic positions in regard to any question of knowledge; one usually
prefers to surrender unconditionally to a conviction harboured by people in
authority” (Nietzsche 1996, 200). While the authoritarian state of mind is
understandable for its historical function, a rened and adult culture should
be in the position to overcome it. e alternative to epistemic convictions,
however, is not to take no position whatsoever like an ancient sceptic, or to
arbitrarily adopt positions at random like an eristic sophist, but to be con-
scious, modest and open-minded about them: “But gradually the scientic
spirit in men has to bring to maturity that virtue of cautious reserve” (Niet-
zsche 1996, 200). e epistemic virtues of “wise moderation” and “cautious
thinking” are formed and developed through a process of learning and re-
learning.
He who has not passed through dierent convictions, but remains in
the belief in whose net he was rst captured, is on account of this
unchangeability under all circumstances a representative of retarded
cultures; in accordance with this lack of cultivation (which always
presupposes cultivatability) he is a man hard, uncomprehending, un-
teachable, ungenerous, everlastingly suspicious and unheeding, who
neglects no means of constantly asserting his own point of view be-
cause he is quite incapable of grasping that there are bound to be other
points of view. (Nietzsche 1996, 200)
e diagnosis of relativism assumes that we are inevitably caught in a net of
beliefs, and that there are more and dierent such nets. e absolutist al-
ternative, according to which we could form beliefs which carry no signs of
such nets, is untenable according to Nietzsche and to many of his scienti-
cally minded contemporaries.e denial of our fundamental ignorance and
uncertainty therefore either leads to the ethnocentric parochialism of those
who eagerly adopt any conspiracy-theory that suits their prejudices, or to
the universalist self-misunderstanding of those who confuse their justied
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beliefs with absolute truths. Both attitudes are the product of weak and del-
icate conditions. Regarding the prospects of cultural transformation, both
are equally dangerous, since they deny the possibility of justied or promis-
ing dierent views. Both cannot cope with the existential lack of absolutes
and clear horizons. If the signicance of the discussion about truth beyond
the scope of epistemic consideration lies in the domain of culture, society,
and politics, Nietzsche sheds light on this issues from a very dierent angle.
e will to truth not only aims for something inaccessible, it also reveals
a weak, insecure and stubborn constitution, incapable of cultivation, plural-
ism, and transformation. Overcoming the ideal of certainty is a liberating
and advantageous epistemic attitude of educated, strong, and cultured peo-
ple. Relativism includes fallibilism and invites change, overcoming, destruc-
tion and transformation, whereas dogmatism and the insistence on absolute
truth hinders new ideas and cultural evolution.e denial of relativity leads
to stagnancy and—according to Guyau—even to barbarism. Accepting the
limited validity even of our best convictions is an epistemic and cultural atti-
tude of strength and sovereignty, which is capable of modesty and tolerance,
whereas those in need for absolute truth, certainty, and safety cannot endure
the existence or even the idea of alternatives. Without alternatives, however,
human life is feeble and the future is empty.
4. eses on Nietzsche and Post-Truth Politics
e cultural functions of truth are reliable orientation, successful control,
and justied agreement. Human beings need to nd their way in a literal and
metaphorical sense, they need to employ, predict and command natural and
cultural resources, and theymust have procedures to harmonize contradict-
ing opinions and convictions. Knowing the naked and simple truth would
be a convenient mean to serve these needs. According to the arguments
raised above, however, we do not command this kind of knowledge.e pre-
tence of absolute certainty is therefore either uninformed or strategic, and
we should rather take our chance with something less perfect. Nietzsche’s
denial of plainly objective factual truth results from applying a historically
evolved and self-reexive will to truth; it is supported by reasons and scien-
tic ndings. It is (of course) not meant to be an objectively true doctrine,
but denotes a reasonable epistemic attitude, while the false belief to know the
truth, is intellectually dissatisfying and culturally dangerous. Nietzsche sees
a necessity to realize the downfall of theWestern quest for absolute truth, be-
cause it enables further cultural transformation. Lack of certainty and cau-
tious reserve is liberating and advantageous for educated, strong, cultured
people. But Nietzsche also suggests and employs functional equivalents to
traditional understandings of truth. He neither renders attempts to well-
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informed orientation, strategic control and reasonable agreement futile, nor
takes any interpretation equally valid. He proposes an art of critical inter-
pretation, and he displays constrained respect for relevant scientic ndings.
However, his main emphasis lies on the necessity of conscious decisions and
value-judgments.
e critical diagnosis of post-truth politics suggests a cultural division
between two camps: those who are the objects of it, found guilty of indier-
ence towards truth, and those who are its subject, judging from a position of
privileged knowledge and understanding. According to Nietzsche, there is
weakness and self-misunderstanding on both sides of the dispute.inking
of Donald Trump and, for example, the debate about the number of atten-
dees at his inauguration, the note that serves as motto of this paper comes to
mind: “Signal of anunscienticman: he takes an opinion for true, if it atters
him and makes him look good” (Nietzsche 1988, 498f). Trump is obviously
prepared to perceive features of the world in a very peculiar way, but he, or
better, what the name of “Trump” (or Farrange, Johnson, Putin, Erdogan, et
al.) stands for, represents no position beyond or post truth, but rather be-
fore enlightenment or modernity. “Trump” and his supporters confuse their
underdetermined convictions with truth, be it obliviously or strategically.
Eectively, they lack the strength to accept uncertainty and they apparently
do not wish to live in a world with open horizons.
Within the domain of contingency, i.e. within the domain of politics
and culture, facts alone are never decisive, even if they were uncontrover-
sial. ey always combine with interests, value-judgments and ideals. In
our daily practices we have to trust in the reliability of information and
testimony provided by others at numerous occasions. Under this condi-
tion it is advisable to respect scientic ndings, since by collaborative work
and critical investigation humankind improved the particular knowledge of
numerous features. We know a lot of singular facts, but politics is about
value-judgements, social organisation and future orientation. Focus on facts
has therefore never been the sole and central concern of politics and public
opinion. Political decisions are evaluative and normative judgments, ideally
based on the best possible information about the state of aairs and under-
standing of probable consequences.e concept of absolute truth denies this
condition.e idea of evidence-based pragmatic policy-making, oen com-
bined with the suggestion that there is no alternative (the TINA-principle),
therefore either underestimates or hides the necessity of value-judgments.
Talk about post-truth eectively serves to discredit the stubborn political
opponent, which similarly shows, to use Nietzsche’s terminology, a bounded
spirit.
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e alternative to dogmatism and oblivious trust in authorities is not
plain and unconstrained truth, but a rened epistemic attitude of cautious
reserve. Admitting the limited validity of our knowledge-claims requires
rst and foremost the self-application of this insight.e public debate about
post-truth, however, reveals a lack of this cautious reserve on both sides.
ose to whom the “post-truth-objection” applies, happily believe whatever
suits them and dogmatically add up positive evidence and reinforcing in-
formation while ignoring any irritation or falsication. ey confuse their
contingent web of beliefs with truth and represent a state of weak, depen-
dent and “retarded cultures” (Nietzsche 1996, 200). ose, however, who
raise the “post-truth-objection” in a moral gesture of superior knowledge,
similarly lack intellectual honesty in their attempt to counterfeit their politi-
cal values for evidence-based truisms. According to Nietzsche, we “know” a
number of more or less uncontroversial individual facts, but facts alone are
never politically decisive, since politics consists in value-judgments and nor-
mative orientations. Processes of political decision-making should be well
informed, but the objection of post-truth denies the possibility of rational
disagreement. “Trump” stands for ignorance and lack of cultivation in his
inability to change his perspective and to acknowledge dierent perspec-
tives, but his opponents also struggle to cope with the irritation he poses.
Both sides assume access to “the truth.” Cultural progress in a way envi-
sioned by Nietzsche is impossible with such a state of mind.e idea of true
politics merely based on facts negates the justied and necessary struggle of
competing interests and values, a struggle which must be fought in an age of
post-truth, too.
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